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Abstract
We study skill- and income-related differences in the access to health care as
drivers of longevity inequality from a theoretical life-cycle as well as from a macroeco-
nomic perspective. To do so, we develop an overlapping generations model populated
by heterogeneous agents subject to endogenous mortality. We model two groups of
individuals for whom differences in skills translate into differences in income and in
the ability to use medical technology effectively in curbing mortality. We derive the
skill- and age-specific individual demand for health care based on the value of life, the
level of medical technology and the market prices. Calibrating the model to the devel-
opment of the US economy and the longevity gap between the skilled and unskilled,
we study the impact of rising effectiveness of medical care in improving individual
health and examine how disparities in health care utilisation and mortality emerge
as a consequence. In so doing, we explore the role of skill-biased earnings growth,
skill-bias in the ability to access state-of-the art health care and to use it effectively,
and skill-related differences in health insurance coverage. We pay attention to the
macroeconomic feedback, especially to medical price inflation. Our findings indicate
that skill-bias related to the effectiveness of health care explains a large part of the
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increase in the longevity with earnings-related differences in the utilisation of health
care taking second place. Both channels tend to be reinforced by medical progress.
Keywords: health care spending, inequality, life-cycle model, life-expectancy
gap, medical price inflation, medical progress, overlapping generations, skill-biased
earnings growth.
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1 Introduction
Growing disparity in longevity across socioeconomic groups has been extensively docu-
mented for the US over the past couple of decades (Hummer and Hernandez 2013; Chetty
et al. 2016; Case and Deaton 2017).1 Such a development is unwelcome for a number of
reasons. First, it may conflict with principles of social justice (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert
2012) and reflect a general increase in economic inequality (Autor et al. 2008; Saez and
Zucman 2013) that is detrimental to social cohesion. Second, inequalities in health have
been shown to cause a drag on economic growth (Grimm 2011). Third, the variation in
life span due to premature death slows down the overall increase in life expectancy at
the population level (Vaupel et al. 2011) and, thus, societal progress against an impor-
tant measure of human development. Finally, inequality in longevity has considerable
implications for the fairness of pension schemes and the incentives they generate across
different social strata (National Academy of Sciences 2015; Lee and Sanchez-Romero 2017;
Sanchez-Romero and Prskawetz 2017).
Three key sources of health-related inequalities can be identified: Differences in be-
haviours (e.g. Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010; Cutler et al. 2011), differences in the
socio-economic environment (e.g. Chetty et al. 2016), and differences in the access to
innovative health care (e.g. Phelan and Link 2005; Glied and Lleras-Muney 2008).2 This
1See OECD (2017) for evidence on similar trends across other industrialised countries.
2For general surveys and summaries of the debate on what are the drivers of health-related inequality
see Deaton (2003), Phelan et al. (2010), Woolfe and Braveman (2011), Truesdale and Jencks (2016) and
Case and Deaton (2017).
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last source is of particular interest for three reasons: First, by being directly linked to the
design of the health care system, this channel opens a straightforward way for the policy
maker to address health-related inequalities by way of implementing appropriate policies.
Conversely, the design of the health care system itself may result in unequal access and
health outcomes. Second, differential access to health care is governed by two key chan-
nels: (i) income differences and differences in health insurance coverage will translate into
differences in the utilisation of health care of given effectiveness ; and (ii) differences in the
ability to access or to use appropriately the most advanced medical treatments translate
into different effectiveness of health care for a given level of utilisation. Third, the income
dynamics on the demand side and medical progress on the supply side may, therefore, be
particularly good candidates for explaining the ongoing widening of the longevity gap.3
While there is a considerable body of empirical literature on the access to health care
(reviewed in Section 2 below), this is mostly based on particular case studies with a focus
on either income differences or on differences in the utilisation of innovative health care.
Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to provide answers to the following set of questions:
(i) How does the inequality in longevity emerge from the interplay of differential earnings
and earnings growth, differential access to the most effective medical treatments, and
differential health insurance coverage; (ii) what quantitative importance can be assigned
to these channels; and (iii) how are these channels shaped by medical progress and by
general equilibrium dynamics, in particular the development of the price for health care?
In order to address these questions, we develop an overlapping generations model pop-
ulated by heterogeneous agents subject to endogenous mortality. We model two groups of
individuals who differ in the level of their skills (or educational attainment) and, according
to their labour productivity, receive differential earnings. In addition, we assume the abil-
ity to access and use new medical technology effectively to increase with skills, implying a
3By medical progress we refer to the development and adoption of both new medical technology and
innovative medical practice both of which raise the effectiveness of medical treatments.
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differential impact of health care on survival. Individuals maximise their life-cycle utility
by purchasing a consumption good from which they derive utility and elective health care
with a view to affecting their survival prospects, the latter proxying also for an individual’s
health status. Assuming that the health status determines non-elective (emergency) health
care, we keep track of this additional and quantitatively important determinant of health
care spending. The economy consists of two sectors: a medical sector providing (elective
and non-elective) health care, and a production sector producing consumption and capital
goods. The relative price of health care is determined endogenously and depends on the
sector-specific use of production factors and their general equilibrium prices.
We derive the age-specific individual demand for health care based on the value of life,
the level of medical technology and the consumer price of health care. Given the income
level as well as the effectiveness of medical care within each of the two groups, we are
able to determine a baseline level of mortality inequality. We then employ counterfactual
analysis to identify the impact on health care utilisation and longevity of (i) skill-biased
technological progress in the production sector, leading to a widening in the earnings gaps;
(ii) skill-bias in the access to state-of-the art medical care and its effective application (or
shorter: skill-bias in medical effectiveness); and (iii) skill-biased coverage of health insur-
ance. We pay particularly close attention to macroeconomic effects caused by differential
productivity growth and medical progress on the price for medical care and its feedback
on the individual demand for health care within the two groups. When studying the role
of productivity growth, we follow Baumol’s (1967) theory, according to which productivity
gains in capital-intensive sectors do not only cause income growth but also led to rising
production costs in labour-intensive sectors, such as health care. Given that income growth
disproportionately benefits high skilled individuals, whereas the price for health care rises
for all individuals, this may also imply a widening gap in the access to health care. We
explore the relevance of this channel in affecting mortality inequality.
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We calibrate the model to reflect the development of US income and life expectancy
over the time span 1960-2015. In so doing we follow Cutler et al. (2006) and Ford et al.
(2006) in attributing 50% of the reduction in mortality to changes in the utilisation and
effectiveness of health care. Focusing in our analysis on the role of health care, we assume
a constant exogenous trend for the remaining 50% that is in line with the data. Here, we
make use of recent evidence by Cutler et al. (2011) showing for the US that the education
gap in mortality that can be attributed to behavioural channels has remained remarkably
stable over the time frame 1971-2000.
We replicate in our model the increase by some 2.1 years in the life expectancy gap
between the 50 percent top earners (representing the skilled) and the 50 percent bottom
earners (representing the unskilled) in the US over the time span 1960-2015. We find that
about 19 percent of the increase are explained by skill-biased earnings growth, about 57
percent by skill-bias in medical effectiveness, and 5 percent by health insurance, whereas
24 percent of the increase are explained by the fact that the initial (1960) gap in earnings
translates into a difference in health care spending which owing to medical progress leads
to a widening gap in survival. Thus, the skilled are able to expand their relative survival
opportunities predominantly (i) due to a rising ability and propensity to spend on health
care in the presence of skilled-biased earnings growth; (ii) due to their better access to state-
of-the-art care for any given level of health care spending, an effect which is exacerbated
due to medical progress overall;4 and (iii) due to a complementarity between income and
medical progress such that their higher consumption of health care from the outset allows
them to participate to an increasing extent in the benefits from medical advances. Finally,
we find that while medical prices increase by a factor of about 1.5 over the time span
1960-2015, this does not contribute to a widening in the longevity gap.
4Intuitively, access to the state-of-the-art treatment for a given condition only matters once effective
treatments have been developed. Thus, skill-related differences in access are reinforced over time with the
advent of more and more effective treatments.
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The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a review of some
recent empirical and theoretical literature on health inequality within life-cycle models
with a particular focus on the utilisation of health care. Section 3 introduces the model;
Section 4 presents the equilibrium allocation; Section 5 introduces the calibration of the
model (Section 5.1) and provides the results of our numerical analysis (Sections 5.2 and
5.3); Section 6 discusses policy implications and the role of medical progress; Section 7
concludes. Some mathematical derivations and details on the numerical simulation have
been relegated to an Appendix.
2 Literature
In this section, we briefly review the empirical and theoretical literature that is pertinent
to our analysis. As we have argued in the introduction, the literature suggests two partic-
ularly prominent drivers of unequal access to health care: First, skill-biased technological
progress across many sectors of the economy has been extensively documented to generate
a widening income gap in advantage of the skilled and educated [see Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) for an overview]. A large empirical literature shows how income differences translate
into differences in the consumption of health care and, more specifically, in the access to
highly effective state-of-the-art health care (e.g. Getzen 2000; Bago d’Uva and Jones 2009;
Vallejo-Torres and Morris 2013). Owing to their higher propensity to consume health care,
wealthier individuals then tend to participate more strongly in the benefits from medical
progress (Goldman and Lakdawalla, 2005). Second, even at the same level of consump-
tion of health care, medical progress is prone to lead to divergent medical outcomes and
trends to life expectancy if individuals from higher socioeconomic groups are able to utilise
medical advances more effectively (Phelan and Link 2005; Glied and Lleras-Muney 2008;
Avitabile et al. 2011; Lange 2011; Hernandez et al. 2018) or have access to higher quality
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treatments (Fiva et al. 2014).5
Our work ties in with a number of recent papers addressing the income and education
related inequality in health outcomes within calibrated life-cycle models. Capatina (2015)
studies the role of different health risks over the life-cycle across different strata of educa-
tion. She does not, however, endogenise the consumption of health care. Ales et al. (2014)
study the (social) efficiency of differences in health care spending and, depending on this,
in longevity across individuals with different earnings potential. Ozkan (2014) studies the
incentives for individuals from different income groups to invest in preventive and curative
care in a model in which health shocks lead to a deterioration of a stock of health and
higher mortality. He finds that the subsidisation especially of preventive health care for
the poor may yield significant welfare gains. Prados (2017) studies the interrelationship
between income and health inequality over the working life with a particular focus on the
feedback from health on earnings. Finally, Cole et al. (2018) study the impact of recent
US reforms aimed at curbing health-related discrimination within the labour and insurance
markets on preventive behaviour and welfare when individuals differ in their health.
None of these works addresses the dynamics of the education/income gradient in mor-
tality as a consequence of skill-biased productivity growth and skill-biased access to medical
progress. Such an analysis is important, as it provides a sound theoretical basis for under-
standing and assessing the transmission channels that underlie the empirical findings on
the impact of education and income on individuals’ propensity to benefit from health care
and medical progress. To our knowledge, the only other theoretical approach towards un-
derstanding the role of differential access to medical progress is Goldman and Lakdawalla
(2005). Studying a static model in which an individual maximises utility depending on
health and consumption, they identify the greater demand for health care on the part of
individuals with high socio-economic status (conditional on medical need) as a key condi-
5See Schro¨der et al. (2016) for a recent systematic review of the literature on the SES gradient in the
access to treatment for coronary heart disease, highlighting effects of both income and education.
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tion for a differential impact on longevity of productivity growth in the health care sector.
This is because an increases in medical productivity, in their case modelled as a decline
in the price of health care, tends to boost the demand for health care by more for those
with greater socio economic status. While the greater propensity to benefit from medical
progress for those with high demand also plays a role in our model, the mechanism goes
through the effectiveness of medical technology rather than the productivity of the health
care sector. Indeed, in line with the empirical evidence the price in health care is increas-
ing in our model rather than declining. More generally, our paper relates to an emerging
literature on the role of medical progress within the macroeconomy (Suen 2009, Chandra
and Skinner 2012, Fonseca et al. 2013, Jones 2016, Koijen et al. 2016, Frankovic et al.
2017, Schneider and Winkler 2017, Bo¨hm et al. 2018, Frankovic and Kuhn 2018). Covering
various aspects of medical progress, these works do not address its role as a driver of the
emerging longevity gap.
3 Model
We consider two groups of individuals who differ in their skill (education) level i = s, u,
with s denoting the skilled and u denoting the unskilled, respectively. The differences in
skills translate into (i) differential labour productivity and, thus, into differential earnings
(as documented e.g. in Acemoglu and Autor 2011); and (ii) into differential ability to use
medical technology/know-how effectively in order to improve health and survival chances
(as documented e.g. in Glied and Lleras-Muney 2008, Avitabile et al. 2011, Lange 2011,
Hernandez et al. 2018). Both groups are represented by overlapping generations of indi-
viduals who choose consumption and health care over their life-course. We should stress
at this point that we are not interested in explaining the causality of income as opposed
to education as drivers of inequality in health, nor any reverse causality, but rather in
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exploring the channels through which differences in education/skills translate into differ-
ent participation in the benefits from health care and medical progress. In light of this,
we also abstract from the intergenerational transmission of skills and wealth and assume
individuals are randomly assigned to either of the skill groups at birth.
3.1 Individual Life-cycle
We begin by specifying the mortality process that is underlying our model. We assume
the force of mortality, µ = ηm (h,M) , to follow a proportional hazard form, where η > 0
is an exogenous shifter of mortality and where
m (h,M) = h−M , (1)
describes the impact of h units of elective health care on mortality, with M > 0 measuring
its effectiveness. Allowing for heterogeneity across skill types, i = s, u, age, a, and time, t,
in regard to the consumption of elective health care, hi(a, t), the exogenous component of
mortality, ηi(a, t), and medical effectiveness, Mi(t), we can write the (a, t, i)-specific force
of mortality as6
µi(a, t) := ηi(a, t)m (hi(a, t),Mi(t)) . (2)
While ηi(a, t) captures exogenous age- and time-related trends to mortality as well as
heterogeneity across skill groups unrelated to the consumption of health care, Mi(t) can
be interpreted as the degree to which an individual of skill type i has access to innovative
treatments at time t or, equivalently, the degree to which a type i uses a given set of
treatments effectively. Intuitively, we would expect 0 < Mu(t) ≤ Ms(t), implying that
unskilled individuals may suffer from restrictions in the access to the most effective health
6We could assume that medical effectiveness also depends on age. We omit age as an argument as we
are subsequently not using it in our calibration.
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care. Such restrictions may arise from knowledge gaps, from lack of social capital in the
communication with physicians, or from less effective use of innovative medicine, e.g. due
to lack of compliance with certain treatment paths or due to the negligence in the attention
of regular screening. In summary, the extent to which the unskilled suffer from a higher
mortality, µu(a, t) > µs(a, t), depends (i) on the extent of an exogenous disadvantage
ηu(a, t) > ηs(a, t) related to life-style and/or living environment, (ii) on the extent to
which they consume a lower quantity of elective health care, hu(a, t) < hs(a, t), and (iii) on
their relative disadvantage in the access to (or use of) the most effective form of medical
medical care, Mu(t) < Ms(t).
We can now formulate the survival function
Si(a, t) = exp
[
−
∫ a
0
µi(â, t̂)dâ
]
as the probability of a type i = s, u to survive from birth at time t0 = t − a through age
a at time t.7 Following Chandra and Skinner (2012), Kuhn et al. (2015) and Frankovic et
al. (2017) we can interpret survival, Si(a, t), as a proxy of the stock of health at (a, t, i).
For the representative individual, the assumption that health care can slow down but not
reverse the decline of health over the life-course is plausible and well in line with evidence
on the gradual accumulation of health deficits (Rockwood and Mitnitski, 2007; Dalgaard
and Strulik 2014).
Building on this notion, we assume that besides deciding on the quantity of elective
health care, hi(a, t), individuals also receive emergency health care according to a function
e(S) = ξ1S
−ξ2 , (3)
with ξ1 ≥ 0 and ξ2 ∈ [0, 1], depending on their health/survival state, S ∈ [0, 1] .
7Note, that t̂ = to + â.
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This reflects the notion that in situations of critical illness, as proxied by a low prob-
ability of survival, individuals must consume a quantity of health care e > 0 in order to
survive without having a degree of choice. Note that the dependency of emergency care
on survival also implies that the consumption of health care tends to be higher close to
the time of an individual’s death (e.g. Zweifel et al. 1999). When chosing elective health
care, individuals internalice the savings on expenditure for emergency health care, as they
accrue from higher levels of survival/health over the life-cycle.
Finally, we assume that during each period of their lives individuals enjoy an instanta-
neous utility
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ + b, (4)
from consumption c ≥ 0, where σ > 1 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and where b > 0 is a constant ”pleasure of living” high enough to ensure
that u(c) > 0 for all relevant values of consumption.8
Based on these ingredients, we can formulate the individual life-cycle problem according
to which a representative from group i = s, u who is born at t0 = t − a maximises the
present value of the utility stream over their (remaining) life-cycle by choosing a stream
of consumption, ci(a, t), and elective health care, hi(a, t), subject to the mortality process
and a budget constraint. Formally, the objective is then given by
max
ci(a,t),hi(a,t)
∫ ω
0
e−ρau(ci(a, t))Si(a, t)da, (5)
where ρ and ω denote the rate of time preference and the maximal attainable age, respec-
8Our assumption σ > 1 reflects our calibration in Section 5.1 and is in line with the evidence in Chetty
(2006).
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tively. The individual faces the following skill-specific state constraints:
·
Si(a, t) = −µi(a, t)Si(a, t), (6)
k˙i(a, t) = r (t) ki(a, t) + l(a)wi(t)− ci(a, t)− φi(a, t)p(t) [hi(a, t) + e(Si(a, t))]
−τi(a, t) + pii(a, t) + s(t), (7)
with Si(0, t0) = 1, Si(ω, t0 + ω) = 0 and ki(0, t) = ki(ω, t) = 0 as boundary constraints.
Survival is reduced over the life-course according to the force of mortality. The individual’s
stock of assets, ki(a, t), (i) increases with the return on the current stock, where r (t) denotes
the interest rate at time t; (ii) increases with earnings, l(a)wi(t), where l(a), as specified in
(21) below, denotes the exogenous labour supply of an individual at age a and where wi(t)
denotes the skill-specific wage rate at time t;9 (iii) decreases with consumption, the price of
consumption goods being normalised to one; (iv) decreases with private health expenditure,
φi (a, t) p(t)(hi(a, t)+e(Si(a, t))), where p(t) denotes the price for health care, where φi (a, t)
denotes an (a, t, i)-specific rate of coinsurance, as specified in (19) below, and where the
total consumption of health care amounts to the sum of elective health care, hi(a, t), and
emergency care, e(Si(a, t)); (v) decreases with an (a, t, i)-specific tax schedule, τi (a, t) , as
specified in (23) below; (vi) increases with (a, t, i)-specific social security benefits, pii (a, t) as
specified in (20) below; and (vii) increases with a lump-sum transfer s(t), as specified in (24)
below, by which the government redistributes accidental bequests across the population.
We follow Frankovic et al. (2017) and others by considering a setting without an annuity
market.
Note that while the market-wide interest rate, r(t), the price for health care, p(t), and
the lump-sum transfer s(t), are identical for both skill groups, their wages are skill-specific,
9We consider skill-independent labour supply l (a) for lack of data. However, this does not imply a loss
of generality, as for the purpose of the present analysis it is sufficient to focus on the pattern of skill-specific
earnings wi(t)l (a) .
12
where we would typically expect ws(t) ≥ wu(t), reflecting higher productivity of the skilled.
The co-insurance rate, tax-rate and pension benefits are also allowed to vary with the skill
level.10
3.2 Population
Denoting by B(t0) the total number of births at time t0, we obtain N
c
i (a, t) = Si(a, t)B(t−
a)/2 as the size of the cohort of skill level i = s, u that was born at time t0 = t− a and is
alive at age a and time t.11
By aggregating over age and skills, we obtain the following expressions for the popu-
lation size (total and by skill group), aggregate capital stock, aggregate effective labour
supply (total and by skill group), aggregate consumption (of final goods) and aggregate
10To summarise the individual problem in a nutshell: The individual’s choice variables are (i) elective
health care, hi(a, t), affecting mortality, m (hi(a, t),Mi (t)) , and in turn survival, Si(a, t), depending on the
exogenous state of medical technology, as captured by the parametric functionMi (t) ; and (ii) consumption,
ci(a, t), affecting period utility, u (ci(a, t)) . Survival, in turn, determines emergency health care, e(Si(a, t),
and both survival and period utility determine life-cycle utility. All prices are given for the individual, as
are taxes, social security transfers, health insurance coverage and accidental bequests.
11We realise that the assumption of an equal distribution of births across skill-groups is artificial. How-
ever, as we will argue in Section 5.1 in greater detail, the 50-50 split of the population implies by construc-
tion that relative group size is immaterial. It is sufficient then to focus on a representative individual from
each of the skill-groups. We need to keep track, however, of the total population size in order to arrive at
a realistic age-structure of the population.
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(consumption of) health care (total and by skill group):12
N(t) = Ns(t) +Nu(t) with Ni(t) =
∫ ω
0
N ci (a, t)da i = s, u, (8)
L(t) = Ls(t) + Lu(t) with Li(t) =
∫ ω
0
li(a)N
c
i (a, t)da i = s, u, (9)
K(t) =
∫ ω
0
[ks(a, t)N
c
s (a, t) + ku(a, t)N
c
u(a, t)] da, (10)
C(t) =
∫ ω
0
[cs(a, t)N
c
s (a, t) + cu(a, t)N
c
u(a, t)] da, (11)
H(t) = Hs(t) +Hu(t) with Hi(t) =
∫ ω
0
[hi(a, t) + e(Si (a, t))]N
c
i (a, t)da i = s, u.(12)
We assume that births grow exogenously at the rate ν such that
B(t) = B0 exp
νt, B0 > 0.
3.3 Production
The economy consists of a manufacturing sector and a health care sector. In the manu-
facturing sector a final good is produced by employment of capital, KY , as well as skilled
and unskilled labour, LYs and L
Y
u , respectively. Assuming a neo-classical Cobb-Douglas
production function
Y (AY , KY , LYs , L
Y
u ) = A
Y
(
KY
)αK (LYs )αs (LYu )αu , (13)
12Note that all aggregate variables are shaped by the (equilibrium) patterns of health care (by skill and
age), which through the survival function determine the age-structure of the population, as measured by
the cohort sizes N ci (a, t). Furthermore, the capital stock, K(t), and aggregate consumption, C (t), reflect
the age-skill patterns of savings and individual consumption, while aggregate health care expenditure,
H (t) , reflect the age-skill patterns of elective and emergency health care.
14
with αK +αs +αu = 1 and with A
Y denoting total factor productivity, we can write profit
in the manufacturing sector as
V Y = Y (AY , KY , LYs , L
Y
u )− wsLYs − wuLYu − [δ + r]KY , (14)
with δ ≥ 0 denoting the rate of capital depreciation. Intuitively, and in line with evidence
on the wage patterns (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor 2011), we have αs ≥ αu. Indeed, we
will assume in Section 5.1 that in line with skill-biased technical progress the factor shares
change over time such that
·
αs >
·
αu.
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In analogy to final goods production, we assume that health care is produced by em-
ployment of capital, KH , as well as skilled and unskilled labour, LHs and L
H
u , respectively.
Again, we assume the production of health care to follow a neo-classical Cobb-Douglas
function
F (AH , KH , LHs , L
H
u ) = A
H
(
KH
)βK (LHs )βs (LHu )βu , (15)
with βK + βs + βu = 1 and with A
H denoting total factor productivity, and obtain profits
V H = pF (AH , KH , LHs , L
H
u )− wsLHs − wuLHu − [δ + r]KH (16)
where p is the price for health care. Note that V Y = V H = 0 in a perfectly competitive
equilibrium. Again, we assume βs ≥ βu and
·
βs >
·
βu.
We allow the factor elasticities in the health care sector to differ from those in final
goods production, where in line with evidence in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) we assume
βK < αK , implying that the health care sector is less capital intensive. We also allow for
13The Cobb-Douglas specification in (13) amounts to the special case of the typical CES formulation
with a unitary elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor
2011). The focus of the present analysis being on the implications of differential earnings growth for health
care rather than the underlying employment changes, we believe this simplification does not greatly bear
on our results.
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cross-sectoral differences in the labour shares, βi Q αi for i = s, u, and in total factor
productivity, AH Q AY .
3.4 Health Insurance, Social Security, Taxation, and Accidental
Bequests
We consider two forms of health insurance: Medicare, as a public insurance for the popu-
lation aged 65 and above, and private health insurance for the full population. Medicare
pays age-specific but time-uniform co-payments such that φMC(a) = 0.5 for a ≥ 65 and
φMC(a) = 0 for a < 65. These co-payments are financed from a dedicated pay-roll tax at
rate τMC (t) such that the budget constraint
τMC(t) [ws(t)Ls(t) + wu(t)Lu(t)] =
p (t)
2
∫ ω
65
 [h
∗
s(a, t) + e
∗
s (a, t)]N
c
s (a, t)
+ [h∗u(a, t) + e
∗
u (a, t)]N
c
u(a, t)
 da (17)
with h∗i (a, t) + e
∗
i (a, t) denoting the equilibrium level of health expenditures for (a, t, i) , is
satisfied at each point in time.14 Private health insurance at an (a, t, i)-specific coverage
rate 1− φPi (a, t) is paid for by (a, t, i)-specific premiums
τPi (a, t) =
[
1− φPi (a, t)
]
p(t) [h∗i (a, t) + e
∗
i (a, t)] ∀ (a, t, i) (18)
such that the insurer breaks even on each individual contract at each point in time. Co-
payments at age/year (a, t) for an individual belonging to group i = s, u are thus given
by
φi(a, t) = φ
MC(a) + φPi (a, t). (19)
14For a precise definition, we have e∗i (a, t) := e (S
∗
i (a, t)) with S
∗
i (a, t) :=
exp
[− ∫ a
0
ηi(â, t̂)m
(
h∗i (â, t̂),Mi
(
t̂
))
dâ
]
.
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Social security benefits are assumed to follow
pii (a, t) =
 0⇔ a < 65pii(t) ≥ 0⇔ a ≥ 65 , (20)
where we assume that all individuals retire fully at age 65, such that
l(a) =
 l̂(a) ≥ 0⇔ a < 650⇔ a ≥ 65 . (21)
Social security is assumed to be funded from a dedicated pay-roll tax at rate τpi (t) such
that the budget constraint
τpi(t) [ws(t)Ls(t) + wu(t)Lu(t)] =
∫ ω
65
[pis(t)N
c
s (a, t) + pis(t)N
c
u(a, t)] da (22)
is satisfied. Finally, a skill/income-specific labour income tax is raised at rates τ ITi (t),
i = s, u, the proceeds of which are used to fund exogenous government expenses G (t) >
0 according to the budget constraint τ ITs (t)ws(t)Ls(t) + τ
IT
u (t)wu(t)Lu(t) = G(t). Thus
total tax payments (including private health insurance premia) at age/year (a, t) for an
individual belonging to group i = s, u are given by
τi(a, t) =
[
τMC(t) + τpi(t) + τ ITi (t)
]
l(a) + τPi (a, t) . (23)
Finally, we assume that accidental bequests are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion across
the population, such that each individual who is alive at t receives a transfer
s(t) =
∫ ω
0
[µs(a, t)ks(a, t)N
c
s (a, t) + µu(a, t)ku(a, t)N
c
u(a, t)] da
N (t)
, (24)
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with population size N (t) given by (8). Note that the redistribution of accidental bequests
across income groups implies a certain levelling of divergences in wealth. We aim for this
specification as the accidental bequests under consideration likely are a poor proxy for
systematic differences in inheritances as drivers of a widening inequality in wealth. For
robustness, we have also run the model under the assumption that accidental bequests are
redistributed within skill groups but have found little quantitative difference.15
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Life-Cycle Optimum
In Appendix 8.1 we show that the optimal patterns of consumption and elective health
care for individuals from group i = s, u can be described as follows.
For the CES specification of utility in (4), the optimal pattern of consumption is char-
acterised by the Euler equation
ci (â, t+ â− a)
ci (a, t)
= exp
{∫ â
a
1
σ
[
r
(
t+ ̂̂a− a)− ρ− µi (̂̂a, t+ ̂̂a− a)] d̂̂a} ∀ (a, â, t, i) ,
(25)
requiring that the ratio of consumption for any two ages/years (â, t+ â− a) and (a, t)
equals the interest r (·) net of the effective discount rate ρ + µi (·), weighted by the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution 1/σ and compounded between these ages/years.16 Im-
portantly, the uninsured mortality risk emerges as an additional factor of discounting in
the absence of annuities. Rising mortality then implies a downward drag on consumption
towards the end of life. Moreover, differences in mortality across the skill groups, trans-
15More specifically, we find that income from bequests is moderately higher for the skilled if bequests
are distributed within skill groups. However, in all cases income from bequests is very small in relation to
earnings, implying that the bequest rule plays no role in quantitative terms.
16Taking logs and considering the limit a → â it is straightforward to convert (25) into the dynamic
representation of the Euler equation
.
ci(a,t)
ci(a,t)
= 1σ [r (t)− ρ− µi (a, t)] .
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late into different patterns of discounting. More specifically, if the unskilled face a greater
mortality risk, i.e. if µu (·) ≥ µs (·) for all ̂̂a ∈ [a, â] with a strict inequality for at least onê̂a, then cu(â,t+â−a)
cu(a,t)
< cs(â,t+â−a)
cs(a,t)
, implying that the unskilled are prone to consume earlier in
life and save less.
In order to describe the optimal level of elective health care spending it is helpful to
define the value health/survival for an individual of group i = s, u at age/year (a, t) , which
for the specifications of emergency health care and utility in (3) and (4), respectively, is
given by
ψi (a, t) =
∫ ω
a
 ci(â,t+â−a)1−σ + ci (â, t+ â− a)σ b
+ξ2φi(â, t+ â− a)p(t+ â− a)e (Si(â, t+ â− a))
 exp [−∫ â
a
r(t+ ̂̂a− a)d̂̂a] dâ.
(26)
The value of an improvement in health/survival at (a, t) thus amounts to the discounted
stream over the expected remaining life-course [a, ω] of (i) the monetary value of consump-
tion utility, ci(·)
1−σ , (ii) the monetary value of being alive, ci (·)σ b, and (iii) the expected
cost saving with respect to emergency care expenditures, ξ2φi (·) p (·) e (·). It is readily
checked that the value of health/survival at each (a, t) increases with the level of the
individual’s consumption over the remaining life-course, and with the savings on future
emergency health care. If their higher income allows the skilled to sustain a higher level
of consumption throughout their entire life course, this immediately implies a higher value
of health/survival. In addition, if the skilled are facing lower mortality rates, their con-
sumption tends to be shifted towards later stages of the life-course, implying that the
wedge in the value of health/survival tends to increase with age. These tendencies are
offset, however, if poorer health, Su(·) < Ss(·), exposes the unskilled to higher payments
for emergency care, e(Su(·)) > e(Ss(·)), which in turn translate into a larger incentive to
save such costs.
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For the specification of mortality in (1), the optimal level of elective health care for
type i = s, u at age/year (a, t)
hi (a, t) =
Mi (t)µi (a, t)ψi (a, t)
φi (a, t) p (t)
∀ (a, t, i) , (27)
is then (implicitly) determined by the value of elective health care, Mi (t)µi (a, t)ψi (a, t),
divided by its consumer price, φi (a, t) p (t) .
17 The value of elective health care, in turn, is
given by the individual’s value of health/survival, ψi (a, t) weighted by a factorMi (t)µi (a, t)
representing the effectiveness of health care, as measured by the elasticity Mi (t) , and the
need for health care, as measured by the current mortality rate µi (a, t) .
Skilled individuals tend to demand a higher volume of elective health care, hs (a, t) >
hu (a, t), as they attach a higher value to health/survival, ψs (a, t) > ψu (a, t) , as they have
access to more effective health care, Ms (t) > Mu (t), and as they enjoy a higher level of
health insurance coverage [see Capatina (2015) for the US], such that φs (a, t) < φu (a, t).
These tendencies are offset to the extent that the skilled face a lower mortality, µs (a, t) <
µu (a, t) . Note, however, that higher emergency spending may expose the unskilled to
similar or even greater total expenditure on health care.
4.2 General Equilibrium
Referring the reader to a more rigorous characterisation of the general equilibrium in
Appendices 8.2 and 8.3 we restrain ourselves here to a brief intuitive description. Perfectly
competitive firms in the two sectors j = Y,H choose capital, K̂j (t) , and the two types of
labour, L̂ji (t) with i = s, u, so as to maximise their respective period profit (14) and (16).
The six first-order conditions determine the six (sector-specific) factor demand functions,
17This condition is equivalent to the condition ψi (a, t) = −φi (a, t) p (t) /mh (·), requiring that the value
of health and survival equals the effective price of survival, as given by the effective consumer price
φi (a, t) p (t) weighted by −1/mh (·) , which is the volume of health care required to lower mortality by one
unit.
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depending on the set of prices {r (t) , ws (t) , wu (t) , p (t)}.18 Likewise, we obtain the age-
and skill-specific demand for consumption goods, ci (a, t) , and health care, hi (a, t) , from
the sets of first-order conditions (25) and (27) of the individual life-cycle problem. The
age profiles of individual wealth, ki (a, t) , then follow implicitly from the life-cycle budget
constraint (7). Aggregating across age-skill-groups at each point in time t according to
(10)-(12) gives us the aggregate supply of capital, K (t) , and the two types of labour,
Li (t) with, i = s, u, as well as the aggregate demand for consumption C (t) and health
care H (t).
The general equilibrium characterisation of the economy is completed by the set of five
market clearing conditions
L̂Hs (t) + L̂
Y
s (t) = Ls(t)
L̂Hu (t) + L̂
Y
u (t) = Lu(t)
K̂Y (t) + K̂H(t) = K(t)
Y (AY (t), K̂Y (t), L̂Ys (t), L̂
Y
u (t)) = C(t) +
·
K(t) + δK (t)
F (AH(t), K̂H(t), L̂Hs (t), L̂
H
u (t)) = H(t)
corresponding to the skill-specific labour markets, the capital market, the market for final
goods and the market for health care, respectively. From these, we obtain a set of four
equilibrium prices {r∗ (t) , w∗s (t) , w∗u (t) , p∗ (t)} and the level of net capital accumulation
·
K (t) . Appendix 8.3 derives equilibrium prices and quantities based on the Cobb-Douglas
production functions specified in (13) and (15), respectively.
18An interior allocation is guaranteed (i) by the Inada conditions being satisfied by Cobb-Douglas func-
tion, and (ii) by a single constraint on the supply of unskilled labour (see Appendix 8.3).
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5 Numerical Analysis
5.1 Calibration Strategy
In the following, we solve the model outlined in the previous section by means of a numerical
simulation. For this purpose, we calibrate the model to reflect the development of the US
economy over the 55-year time span 1960-2015, capturing the evolution of income and
life-expectancy among rich and poor individuals as well as the growth of average health
care expenditures, medical technology and the price for medical care. While we assume
general equilibrium, we do not impose balanced growth assumptions but rather consider
the economy’s development over the time span 1960-2015 as a transition path between two
steady states, lying outside the time frame under consideration.19
In order to study the various drivers of differential longevity growth, we first introduce
exogenous time trends to the skill-specific labour shares in a way that replicates the evo-
lution of the income distribution. As the labour share of the skilled group grows at the
expense of the unskilled, the skilled (unskilled) group’s per-capita yearly income matches
the evolution of mean income among the top (bottom) 50% of the income distribution, as
found in the data. We then apply average federal tax-rates such that we obtain realistic
after-tax income growth within each group. Hence, our model incorporates the increasing
income inequality in the US over the last decades, as driven by skill-biased technological
change.
Second, we introduce exogenous medical progress that increases the effectiveness of
medical care in our model economy. Here, we assume for the unskilled relative to the
skilled a lag of 8 years in the access to the state-of-the art medical technology. This lag
increases the life-expectancy gap between the skill groups to a realistic level and contributes
to a widening of the gap over time.
19More details on the simulation can be found in the final paragraph of Appendix 8.4.
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Third, following Capatina (2015) we consider skill-related differences in health-insurance
coverage. The unskilled are subject to a slightly lower degree of coverage, exposing them
to a higher consumer price of health care.
Fourth, in line with a considerable body of evidence (see Sheiner and Malinovskaya
2016) we assume slower productivity growth in the health care sector as opposed to final
goods production. In line with Baumol (1967), this implies that the health care sector
absorbs an increasing share of labour, while at the same time the price of health care
increases endogenously.
Due to these four factors that govern the access of the two skill/income groups to
effective health care, life-expectancy among the skilled/rich and unskilled/poor diverges
endogenously in the model. The diverging life-expectancies match quite well recent data on
the development of life-expectancy by income strata as provided by Chetty et al. (2016).
The model thus offers an economic rationale for the trends observed. Given the finding by
Cutler et al. (2011) that changes in behavioural patterns have contributed relatively little
to the progression of the life-expectancy gap, we conjecture that a large part of the trend
can, indeed, be explained by differential access to health care. Our analysis will allow us
to assess the contribution of each of the four channels. Further details on the calibration
and data we employ are provided in the following, a technical description of the numerical
solution method is provided in Appendix 8.4.
Demography
Individuals enter the model economy at age 20 and can reach a maximum age of 100 with
model time progressing in single years.20 In our model, a ”birth” at age 20 implies a
maximum age ω = 80. Population dynamics are partly endogenous due to mortality that
is determined within the model and partly exogenous due to a growth of ”births” at the
20We follow the bulk of the literature and neglect life-cycle decisions during childhood.
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fixed rate ν = 0.017, which together with the underlying survival process generates a share
of the population 65+ and of the aggregate labour force participation that is roughly in
line with the data.21 An in-depth description for our modelling of mortality and survival
is provided further on below.
Note that the size of the skilled and unskilled group does not change over time and
the overall population grows at a constant rate. This assumption is reflecting our choice
of the skilled (unskilled) group to represent the 50% of population with top (bottom)
earnings at each point in time. While this obviously amounts to an approximation of
unobserved skills (or education) through income, we believe this to be legitimate in the
light of observational equivalence in our data. We should also stress that we understand
skilled/rich and unskilled/poor individuals to be representatives of their respective groups.
Thus, we cannot - and for reasons of modelling clarity - do not wish to model the transition
of individuals between the high and low income groups.
Income
Data on the market income evolution of the rich and poor in our model is based on the
evolution of mean income within the top and bottom 50% of the households in the US,
as provided by the United States Census Bureau, Table H-3.22 Since after-tax income is
the decisive variable in the spending decisions of households, we also match the after-tax
income evolution of the two groups in our model with the respective trends for the top and
bottom 50% of households. For this purpose, we employ data from Congressional Budget
Office (2016) on the mean market income and after-tax income of households in quintiles
21Our model generates a share of the population 65+ of 13.3% and 17.7% for 1960 and 2010, respectively.
Following US census data (adjusted to refer to the population without individuals aged less than 20) the
corresponding empirical targets are 14.8 % (1960) and 17.7 % (2010).
22The Table H-3 ”Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent”
is available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-
households.html. We approximate the top (bottom) 50 % mean income by the average of mean incomes
among the top (bottom) three fifths, where the third fifth receives only half the weight in each of our two
groups.
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for the year 2013. Since the same publication shows that market-income and after-tax
income inequality among US households has not diverged to any great extent over the last
decades, we use the 2013 ratio of after-tax to market income of the top and bottom 50%
to obtain average tax rates for each group, namely 22.7% for the top income group and
8.7% for the bottom income group. We then introduce these figures as exogenous labour
income tax rates on each group separately and obtain a realistic evolution of after-tax
income inequality in the model. For the lack of better data, we assume that the age-
specific labour supply does not differ between skill groups and is constant over the whole
time horizon (while wages increase). We then proxy the effective labour supply of both
age groups by an age-specific income schedule taken from Frankovic et al. (2017).
Life-expectancy, Mortality, Medical Progress and Emergency Expenditure
Average life-expectancy among individuals from the top and bottom 50% income groups
are taken from Chetty et al. (2016).23 The data series is limited to the years 2001 through
2014. However, by applying the calibration procedure described shortly to mortality data
from the Human Mortality Database we are able to trace the group specific life-expectancy
back to earlier years.
We begin by noting that, based on (1) and (2), the force of mortality, µi(a, t), is
endogenously determined in the model and depends on health care, hi (a, t), as a decision
variable, on the access to the newest medical technology, Mi(t), and on the exogenous
shifter ηi(a, t). We then calibrate the parametric components of (2) as follows.
First, we fix the exogenous skill-gradient in mortality that is unrelated to health care
by employing the evidence by Cutler et al. (2011) that ηs (a, t) /ηu (a, t) ≈ 0.9 at all
times and for all age groups.24 In order to capture the age-component of ηi(a, t), we
23We use Table 2 from the accompanying website at https://healthinequality.org/data/. Life-expectancy
is given disaggregated to sex and hundred income percentiles. We aggregate the data to obtain average
life-expectancy among the top and bottom 50% of income distribution.
24We obtain the ratio ηs (a, t) /ηu (a, t) ≈ 0.9 from Table 4 in Cutler et al. (2011) as follows. Here, the
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consider the year 1980 and find the pattern for ηs (a, 1980) that together with ηu (a, 1980) =
ηs (a, 1980) /0.9 generates age-specific mortality rates for the US that match the data in
the Human Mortality Database. Following the evidence in Ford et al. (2006) that around
50% of the decline in (coronary) mortality can be attributed to medical care, we fit a time
trend to ηs (a, t) that, again under preservation of the relationship ηu (a, t) = ηs (a, t) /0.9,
explains 50% of the decline in average mortality over the time span 1960-2015.25 The
implied schedules of ηi(a, t) are combined with the initial income gap in 1960 to determine
the initial life-expectancy gap in the model.
Second, and turning to the part of mortality that is amenable to health care, we choose
the elasticity of mortality with respect to health care utilisation, mhh/m = −M , in the
range of −0.1 to −0.25 for both skill groups, which over the time frame 1960-2015 are in
line with the estimated elasticities reported in Hall and Jones (2007).
Third, we choose a growth trend to medical effectiveness such that together with the
spending elasticities and the exogenous component to mortality explain the joint evolution
of health care expenditure per capita and longevity averaged across both skill groups.
Fourth, we assume that medical effectiveness for the unskilled lags behind the respec-
tive value for the skilled. We choose a lag of 8 years which, in the presence of medical
progress and the skill-specific patterns for health care, increases the life-expectancy gap to
a magnitude in line with the data.26 Thus, we set Mu(t) = Ms(t − 8). Assuming Ms (t)
relative risk figures for Model A reflect the unconditional mortality ratio µ̂uc (t) := µs (t) /µu (t), whereas
the figures for Model B reflect relative mortality conditioned on behaviours. Denoting this ratio by µ̂c (t),
assuming that the ratio ηs (a, t) /ηu (a, t) predominantly reflects behavioural differences, neglecting the age
component and employing the identity µ̂uc (t) = µ̂c (t) [ηs (t) /ηu (t)] gives us ηs (t) /ηu (t) = µ̂uc (t) /µ̂c (t) .
According to column (1) in Table 4 (Cutler et al. 2011), reflecting data from 1971-1975, we have µ̂uc (t) =
0.78 and µ̂c (t) = 0.88 so that ηs (a, t) /ηu (a, t) = 0.89. Similar values obtain for columns (2)-(6), with
ηs (a, t) /ηu (a, t) = 0.9 being well in the middle of the range.
25We were unable to retrieve evidence on the role of behavioural factors as opposed to medical care
for other diseases than coronary heart disease. We thus assume the findings by Ford et al. (2006) to be
representative.
26Lags by socio-economic status in the diffusion/uptake of state-of-the art medical procedures have been
reported for a number of conditions and health care settings (e.g. Skinner and Zhou 2004, Korda et al.
2011, Wang et al. 2012, Hagen et al. 2015, Clouston et al. 2017) with some notable exceptions (Goldman
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to reflect the state-of-the-art medical technology, we impose a growth trend on Ms (t) that
together with the lagged Mu(t) is consistent with the growth of the life-expectancy in the
data for the two skill-groups.
Note, however, that changing the path of the frontier technology Ms(t) for a given
ηi(a, t) will change the share of mortality decline that is attributable to health care. Thus,
our initial calibration of ηi(a, t) (chosen to match a 50% share) needs to be redone for the
new path of Ms(t). Vice versa, changing the calibration of ηi(a, t) will require adjusting
the path of Ms(t) to obtain the empirical evolution of life-expectancy. For this reason,
we apply the calibration strategy iteratively until both the share of mortality reductions
attributable to health care as well as the life-expectancy evolution across groups match
their empirical targets.
Finally, we assume that the parameters in (3), describing the functional form for emer-
gency health care, are given by ξ1 = 0.3 and ξ2 = 0.1 in our calibration.
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Utility
For the instantaneous utility function in (4), we choose the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution to be σ = 1.125, which is within the range of the empiri-
cally consistent values identified by Chetty (2006). Setting b = 9 then guarantees that
u(ci (a, t)) ≥ 0 for all (a, t, i) and generates an average VOL that lies within the range of
plausible estimates, as suggested in Viscusi and Aldy (2003).28 Moreover, we assume a
rate of time preference ρ = 0.02.
Finally, following Frankovic and Kuhn (2018) we impose a minimum consumption level
and Smith 2005). Most of these studies find that these lags translate into mortality differences, again with
some exceptions (Hagen et al. 2015).
27While we were unable to identify direct evidence to inform our calibration of ξ1 and ξ2 we chose the
values in a way that generates a plausible pattern of health expenditures across the skill groups. Not
adjusting health expenditure for health status through the dependency in (3) would generate much too
high an expenditure gap in favour of the skilled.
28The model yields a value of life of approx. 4 million USD for skilled and 1.5 million USD for unskilled
individuals.
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Table 1: Insurance share of health expenditures
Top 50% Bottom 50%
1996-2002 2003-2010 1996-2002 2003-2010
Employer-based
insurance, during working life
0.651 0.637 0.588 0.546
Employer-based insurance
during retirement
0.141 0.126 0.111 0.093
Medicare 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Total Retirement 0.641 0.626 0.611 0.593
equal to the social security benefit (of the bottom 50%) at a given point in time. We do
so in order to avoid negative asset holdings at old age, as would otherwise result from
ex-ante optimisation.29 Given that retirees cannot usually borrow against pension income
and given that individuals are downspending their assets in old age (as they do within our
model) the minimum consumption constraint is plausible.
Health Insurance, Social Security and Taxation
We follow Capatina (2015) with respect to the calibration of insurance coverage. She
reports average co-payment shares for individuals with (skilled) and without (unskilled)
college education over the time frames 1996-2002 and 2003-2010, respectively. Table 1
provides an overview of average health expenditure shares payed for by various insur-
ance programs. The Medicare tax rate τMC (t) and the private health insurance premium
τPi (a, t) are then determined in equilibrium according to the budget constraints (17) and
(18), respectively.
Individuals aged 65 or above receive Social Security (SS) benefits financed by a payroll-
29Individuals choose old-age consumption at the beginning of their life, attaching a low probability to
reaching very high ages. Consumption allocated to these ages (in the absence of a minimum consumption
level) is thus very low and can fall below the social security income, such that it is optimal to pay back
debt (accumulated to finance consumption at earlier ages) at very high ages with excess social security
income.
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tax levied on working individuals. We use data from the EBRI Databook on Employee
Benefits30 that report average SS income for five income quintiles for those aged 65 and
higher from 1976 to 2012. From this, we construct average SS income for the top and
bottom income group following the same method as for market income. The data indicates
that SS income for the bottom 50% has increased from 6400 (2012 constant) USD in 1976
to 9400 USD in 2012, whereas SS benefits for the top 50% have risen from 13600 USD to
14650 USD. In the model, total social security outlays are fully financed by a payroll tax
levied uniformly on all workers at a given point in time. The payroll tax τpi (t) is calculated
according to the budget constraint (22) and amounts to 5.2% in 1975 and 8.6% in 2015.
Finally, we set the income tax rates τ ITs (t) = 0.227 and τ
IT
u (t) = 0.087 to match the
US after-tax earnings distribution in the year 2013.
Production Technology and Productivity Growth
Following Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), we set the capital share in final goods production
and in the health care sector to αK = 1/3 and βK = 1/5 and keep these values constant for
all times.31 In contrast, we assume time-dependent factor shares for skilled and unskilled
labour and set their values as follows. For t ≤ 1960, we set αs (t) = 1/2 for the final goods
sector and βs (t) = 3/5 for the health care sector. Noting that αu (t) = 1−αK −αs (t) and
βu (t) = 1− βK − βs (t) we obtain αu (t) = 1/6 and βu (t) = 1/5 for t ≤ 1960, respectively.
Hence, the labour share in each sector is divided in a way, that three quarters of labour
income go towards the skilled workers. This generates a ratio of skilled vs. unskilled
earnings in line with the US earnings data.
We then scale AY (t ≤ 1960) such that the absolute values of earnings match the targeted
30The complete Databook is available at https://www.ebri.org/publications/books/index.cfm?fa=databook.
The data we use is provided in chapter 3.
31Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) refer to the US NAICS classification category 62 ”Health care and
social assistance”, which includes ambulatory health care services (621); hospitals (622); nursing and
residential care facilities (623); and social assistance (624) as reported by the Bureau of labour Statistics.
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values in t = 1960. In order to match the evolution of the absolute value of skilled earnings
and the ratio between skilled and unskilled earnings after 1960, we choose an appropriate
growth rate for AY (t) as well as for αs (t) and βs (t), assuming that they preserve the
(initial) ratio αs (1960) /βs (1960) = 5/6. This calibration strategy yields a growth rate of
0.7% for AY (t) and an increase of αs (t) and βs (t) by 10% over 50 years up until t = 2010,
such that αs(2010) = 0.55 and βs(2010) = 0.66.
According to equation (44) in Appendix 8.3, the evolution of the price of health care is
determined by the growth rate of AH (t) together with the evolution of the interest rate.as
well as the skilled and unskilled wage rate. The latter two being targeted to replicate
the data on after-tax earnings, we choose the growth rate of AH (t) to be −1%, as this
value induces p (t) to grow over time in accordance with data by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis on the growth of medical prices relative to the overall CPI.32,33 The interest rate is
endogenously determined and evaluates at r (t) = 0.040 in 1975 and r (t) = 0.027 in 2015.
The decline in the interest rate is due to population ageing and a subsequent increase in
average savings across the population.
Overview of Functional Forms and Parameters
Table 2 summarises the most important parameters we are employing.
32Again, we calibrate iteratively: changes in AY (t) and AH (t) will affect not only p (t) but also r (t),
which in turn feeds back into p (t), implying we have to readjust AY (t) and AH (t) until we find a pattern
consistent with the data.
33Note that negative productivity growth in the US health care sector (in terms of non-quality adjusted
output) at around−1% is consistent with the empirical evidence from recent studies (Triplett and Bosworth
2004; Harper et al. 2010).
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Parameter & Functional Forms Description
ω = 80 life span
t0 = 1950 entry time of focal cohort
ρ = 0.02 pure rate of time preference
σ = 1.125 inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution
δ = 0.05 rate of depreciation
αK = 0.33 elasticity of capital in Y
βK = 0.2 elasticity of capital in F
ξ1 = 0.3 scale of emergency health care function
ξ2 = 0.1 elasticity in emergency health care function
Table 2: Model parameters
5.2 Scenarios
In the following, we present five sets of results. To begin with, the benchmark scenario
in Section 5.2.1 describes the development of the economy and the resulting inequality in
longevity over the time span 1960-2015. Set against this, we study the following counter-
factual scenarios. Recalling the three forms of skill-bias in (i) earnings growth, (ii) medical
effectiveness, and (iii) health insurance, we first study three counterfactual scenarios in
each of which we eliminate one form of skill-bias, assuming the benchmark trend for the
remaining two. Thus, in Section 5.2.2 we consider the absence of skill-bias in productivity
change and wage growth; in Section 5.2.3 we consider the absence of a lag in the access of
the unskilled to the most effective health care; and in Section 5.2.4 we consider the absence
of a skill-bias in health insurance coverage.
We amend this analysis by studying a fourth counterfactual in Section 5.2.5, where we
assume the price for medical care to be fixed while letting the three forms of skill-bias
follow their benchmark trends. This is to gauge whether medical price inflation, which per
se is without bias, leads to skill-related differences in access.
Finally, we study in Section 5.3 a counterfactual for which we assume the simultaneous
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absence of skill-bias in all three dimensions, leaving medical price inflation to take place as
in the benchmark. We employ this ”triple” counterfactual to identify the joint contributions
of the three dynamic forms of skill-bias in the access to effective health care.
5.2.1 Benchmark
As is well known, the US have experienced more than half a decade of growing earnings
inequality (Autor et al. 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2011). In our benchmark, we trace
this development over the time span 1960-2015 for the after-tax earnings of the top 50%
group as opposed to the bottom 50% group. In terminology of our model, we understand
these two groups to be the ”skilled” with high earnings as opposed to the ”unskilled” with
low earnings. Figure 1 plots differential earnings growth in our model against the data.
Recall that earnings growth reflects the exogenous trends in the income shares for skilled
and unskilled labour, αs (t) , αu (t) and βs (t) , βu (t), respectively.
1960 1980 2000 20200
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10
15
After−tax income
year
$ 1
00
00
Figure 1: Evolution of after-tax wages for the (skilled) top 50% (blue, solid) and the
(unskilled) bottom 50% (cyan, dashed); Circles denote after-tax mean income of the top
and bottom 50% as reported by the US census office
Furthermore, we assume medical technology to grow exponentially in a way that the
increase in skill-specific life-expectancy in the model matches the data (Figure 2, left panel).
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This embraces the lag of 8 years for the unskilled to have access to the most effective health
care, implying that Mu (t) = Ms (t− 8) .
1960 1980 2000 20200.5
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1960 1980 2000 20200.5
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Price for medical care
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00
00
Figure 2: Evolution of the level of medical technology for the skilled, Ms(t) (blue, solid),
and unskilled, Mu(t) (cyan, dashed); and evolution of the price for medical care p (t)
The third bias in respect to health insurance coverage is reflected in the insurance
shares presented in Table 1. While across the two time frames 1996-2002 and 2003-2010
there is a general trend towards a lower share of private health insurance, this is more
pronounced for the 50% bottom earners. On average, over 2003-2010 their employer-based
insurance coverage during working life amounts to only 85.7% of the coverage enjoyed by
the 50% top earners. At 73.8%, the coverage gap for employer-based insurance becomes
more pronounced during retirement, but this is largely compensated for by the availability
of Medicare.
As Baumol (1967) shows, lagging productivity growth in the health care sector as
opposed to final goods production leads to the reallocation of labour into the more labour
intensive health care sector as well as to an increase in the wage rate(s). In combination,
these effects drive up the price of health care, reflecting the increasing relative cost of
producing health care (Figure 2, right panel).34 Over the time span 1980-2000, medical
prices have risen 1.6 times faster than the overall CPI according to the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. This compares quite well with the 1.5-fold increase in p over the same time period
34See Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) for a thorough analytical treatment of the underlying mechanisms
as well as Frankovic et al. (2017) for a discussion how medical progress may lead to similar allocational
impacts.
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in our benchmark economy.
Due to differential income growth, differential access to the most effective health care,
differential health insurance coverage, and possibly due to the increase in the price of health
care, the life-expectancy of the top and bottom 50% earners diverges over time, as can be
seen in Figure 3.
1960 1980 2000 202070
75
80
85
90
Life−expectancy at birth
year
Figure 3: Evolution of life-expectancy for skilled (blue, solid) and unskilled (cyan, dashed)
While life-expectancy increases by some 11.3 years from 76.2 in 1960 to 87.5 in 2015
for the high skilled top earners it increases by only 9.2 years from 73.8 to 83.0 for the low
skilled. This amounts to almost a doubling of the life-expectancy gap from 2.4 years in
1960 to 4.5 years in 2015.
Figure 4 plots average health care expenditure, p (t)Hi (t) /Ni (t) with Ni (t) and Hi (t)
defined in (8) and (12), respectively, within each skill group i = s, u. It can be seen that one
factor underlying the growing life-expectancy gap is the gradual divergence between the
spending paths of the skilled as opposed to the unskilled. Here, the skilled increase their
spending at a much higher rate, which is well in line with the complementarity between
income growth and medical progress as drivers of health care expenditure (Fonseca et al.
2013; Frankovic and Kuhn 2018).
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Figure 4: Average health care expenditures for the skilled (blue, solid) and unskilled (cyan,
dashed)
5.2.2 Counterfactual I: No Skill-bias in Earnings Growth
In the following subsections, the benchmark run will be represented by blue solid graphs,
whereas the respective counterfactual experiments will be represented by green, dashed
graphs. As a first counterfactual, we consider a set-up where from 1960 onwards there is
no skill-bias in earnings growth, in the sense of the income shares for skilled and unskilled
labour remaining constant at their 1960 levels over the time span 1960-2015. Technically,
this amounts to assuming αcfs (t) ≡ αs (1960) and βcfs (t) ≡ βs (1960) for all t. What
remains is the initial earnings gap, while medical progress and health insurance continue
to be biased in favour of the skilled, as they are in the benchmark scenario.
As can be seen in Figure 5, the discontinuation of skill-biased earnings growth leads
to a sizeable ”redistribution” of income in favour of the unskilled. While the reduction
in earnings growth for the skilled implies an after-tax income in 2015 that is around 10%
below its benchmark level, the unskilled receive a significant boost to earnings, leaving
them with an after-tax income in 2015 that is around 36% above the benchmark level.
Figure 6 shows that the removal of the skill-bias in earnings growth from 1960 on-
wards slows down the increase in the health care spending gap. With the skilled spending
moderately less and the unskilled moderately more, there is a relative closure in the gap.
However, for two reasons this effect is rather limited: First, the unskilled continue to suf-
35
1960 1980 2000 20202
2.5
3
3.5
4
After−Tax Income: unskilled
year
$ 1
00
00
1960 1980 2000 20204
6
8
10
12
After−Tax Income: skilled
year
$ 1
00
00
Figure 5: Evolution of earnings for the skilled and unskilled: Benchmark (blue, solid) and
counterfactual I (green, dashed)
fer from the initial earnings gap, and, owing to the complementarity between income and
medical progress, this translates into a lower incentive to expand health care spending in
response to medical progress. Second, the incentive for the unskilled to expand health care
spending is curbed by the relatively low effectiveness of the health care they can access,
whereas the incentive for the skilled to reduce spending is curbed by the relatively high
effectiveness of the health care foregone.
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Figure 6: Average health care expenditures for skilled (blue, solid in the benchmark and
dark-green, dotted in counterfactual I) and unskilled (cyan, dashed in the benchmark and
light-green, dotted in counterfactual I)
This notwithstanding, a counterfactual break on the ongoing divergence of earnings
together with the resulting reallocation of health care expenditure would slow down the
growth in the longevity gap (calculated as the difference in life expectancy at each point
in time) between the skill groups, as is visualised in Figure 7. Absent the continuation of
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skill-biased earnings growth from 1960 to 2015, the longevity gap would expand by only
1.7 years instead of 2.1 years.
1960 1980 2000 20202
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Life−expectancy gap
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Figure 7: Evolution of life expectancy gap: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counterfactual I
(green, dashed)
5.2.3 Counterfactual II: No Skill-bias in the Effectiveness of Health Care
This counterfactual explores the role of skill-bias in the access to (or in the use of) state-
of-the-art medical technology. The green, dashed plot in the following graphs thus refers
to a counterfactual scenario in which there is no lag in the evolution of medical technology
available to the unskilled, such that M cfu (t) ≡ Ms (t) for the time span 1960-2015. As
Figure 8 shows, the immediate access to state-of-the-art medical technology would boost
the increase in life-expectancy among the unskilled and would slow down the increase in
the longevity gap from 2.1 to only 0.9 years by 2015.
1960 1980 2000 202070
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Figure 8: Evolution of life-expectancies and life-expectancy gap: Benchmark (blue, solid)
and counterfactual II (green, dashed)
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Surprisingly, the immediate access to effective health care does not raise much the
average health care spending among the unskilled (see Figure 9).35 Thus, the counterfac-
tual reduction in the longevity gap is explained by the higher.effectiveness of health care
utilisation by the unskilled alone.
1960 1980 2000 20200
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Figure 9: Average health care expenditures for skilled (blue, solid in the benchmark and
dark-green, dotted in counterfactual II) and unskilled (cyan, dashed in the benchmark and
light-green, dotted in counterfactual II)
5.2.4 Counterfactual III: No Skill-bias in Health Insurance Coverage
Here, we assume that for unskilled individuals co-insurance levels are lowered to those faced
by the skilled, such that φcfu (a, t) ≡ φs (a, t) over the time span 1960-2015. This amounts
to an increase in health insurance coverage at the lower end of the income distribution,
which to some extent is representing the idea of the 2010 Affordable Care Act (Obama
Care). The effects we find are very small, and we therefore abstain from illustrating them
graphically. Overall, the life-expectancy gap would be about 0.1 year lower in 2015 in the
absence of a skill-bias in health insurance. Given the relatively minor differences in health
insurance coverage between the top 50% and bottom 50% income groups (consult Table 1
for the magnitudes involved), this is unsurprising.
We should caution, however, that our focus on two income groups only is likely to
obscure much larger effects at the tails of the distribution. In particular, we would expect
35At the level of the individual, it can be verified that health care expenditure is deferred to later stages
of the life-cycle, but this does not lead to an increase in per capita spending among the unskilled.
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a lot of variance in the degree of health insurance coverage within the bottom 50% income
group where many individuals within the lowest income strata are lacking health insurance
entirely. Opening access to health care for these individuals through the provision of health
insurance should yield significant gains in longevity.
5.2.5 Counterfactual IV: No Medical Price Inflation
In this counterfactual, we explore whether the inflation in the price for health care, as
is induced by productivity growth in the final goods sector, exacerbates inequality in the
access to health care and the resulting gap in life-expectancy. One concern may be that
the unskilled are doubly punished by not participating in productivity-driven increases in
earnings while at the same time being exposed to price inflation in the health care sector.
Thus, we consider a counterfactual scenario in which we fix to a constant level the price
for health care from 1980 onward, such that pcf (t ≥ 1980) = p (1980) , as is depicted in
Figure 10. Note that this implies that from 1980 onward the health care market does not
actually clear in the counterfactual.
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Figure 10: Evolution of the price for medical care: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counter-
factual IV (green, dashed)
In the absence of medical price inflation, the average demand for health care rises
for both groups relative to the benchmark (see right panel in Figure 11) while average
health care expenditures fall within both groups (see left panel in Figure 11). Note that
this is consistent with a demand elasticity of health care below one (McGuire 2012). As a
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consequence of the greater demand for health care in the absence of medical price inflation,
life-expectancy rises for both groups relative to the benchmark (Figure 12) .
1960 1980 2000 20200
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Average health care expenditures by skill group
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Figure 11: Average health care expenditures pHi/Ni and demand Hi/Ni for the skilled
i = s (blue, solid in the benchmark and dark-green, dotted in counterfactual IV) and
unskilled i = u (cyan, dashed in the benchmark and light-green, dotted in counterfactual
IV)
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Figure 12: Evolution of life-expectancy: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counterfactual II
(green, dashed).
Notably, this has no significant effects on the life-expectancy gap, as seen in Figure 13.
Indeed, in the absence of medical price inflation (from 1980 onward) both groups would
face an increase in life expectancy by about 1.25 years in 2015. Thus, while medical price
inflation slows down in a substantial way the expansion in life expectancy, it does not
increase the gap. As the right panel in Figure 11 shows, medical price inflation curbs the
demand for health care for the skilled to a greater extent. In and of itself, this would
suggest even a closure in the life expectancy gap, which is (marginally) true. This effect,
in turn, however is offset by the fact that due to decreasing returns of health care, the
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Figure 13: Evolution of life-expectancy gap: Benchmark (blue, solid) and counterfactual
IV (green, dashed)
reduction in health care from a lower level leads to a larger increase in mortality for the
unskilled.
5.3 Explaining the Growth in the Life-expectancy Gap
In order to gauge the contribution of the three forms of skill-bias towards explaining the
growth in the life-expectancy gap over the time span 1960-2015 we consider a final counter-
factual (V) in which we assume the absence of skill-bias in all three directions, amounting
to the combined application of the assumptions for the counterfactual scenarios (I)-(III).
For this scenario, we find an increase of 0.5 years in the longevity gap from 2.4 years in
1960 to 2.9 years in 2015.
This implies that about 24% of the 2.1 year increase in the longevity gap in the bench-
mark scenario remain unexplained by skill-bias. Given the evidence in Cutler et al. (2011)
that behavioural changes have contributed little to the increase in the longevity gap and
given our finding that medical price inflation has no sizeable impact, the ”residual” increase
can be attributed to income-related differences in the use of new medical technology and
in the gains from it. Although the income gap is assumed not to widen beyond its initial
1960 value, the persistence of a (constant) income gap in itself induces a widening of the
longevity gap. This is because the propensity to expend on increasingly effective health
care increases at a higher rate for the top earners due to the complementarity between
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Table 3: Comparing Benchmark and Counterfactuals (CFs) to identify contribution of
biases
Longevity gap in 2015
Increase
1960-2015
due to bias
share of benchmark
incease explained
Benchmark 4.5 years 2.1 years - -
CF I: no skill-bias in earnings 4.1 years 1.7 years 0.4 years 19 %
CF II: no skill-bias in med. eff. 3.3 years 0.9 years 1.2 years 57 %
CF III: no skill-bias in insurance 4.4 years 2.0 years 0.1 years 5 %
Sum CF I-III: - - 1.7 years 81%
CF V: CF I-III combined 2.9 years 0.5 years - 24%
income and medical progress Thus, any given gap in income generates more and more
diverse outcomes over time, reflecting the lower capacity of the unskilled to participate in
the benefits from medical progress.
We conclude by summarizing in Table 3 the contribution of the various channels to
the increase in the longevity gap over the time span 1960-2015. We omit medical price
inflation [counterfactual (IV)] as it did not generate a sizeable impact.
According to the last column of the table, skill-bias in earnings growth, in the access
to state-of-the art medical technology, and in health insurance coverage account for about
19%, 57% and 5%, respectively, of the increase in the longevity gap. Strikingly, about
70% of the combined effects can be attributed to a bias in the lack of access to the newest
medical technology. This said, income differences matter not just through their dynamic
effect but also through their interaction with (unbiased) medical progress. With 24% of
the total increase in the longevity gap being attributable to this channel and, thus, only
76% being attributable to the combination of the three forms of skill-bias, we find that, in
sum, the individual biases I-III are ”overpredicting” the longevity gap by some 5%.
While this amounts to only a moderate ”error”, it suggests that complementarities be-
tween the different forms of skill-bias do not matter much in explaining the combined effect.
This may appear surprising in light of the finding by Fonseca et al. (2013) and Frankovic
42
and Kuhn (2018) that the complementarity between income, medical progress and health
insurance is crucial for explaining the increase in health expenditures. To understand the
absence of complementarity across the different biases, it is helpful to realise that comple-
mentarities take effect through spending incentives, where e.g. the willingness to spend an
additional dollar of income increases with the effectiveness of medical technology. While
such a mechanism is, indeed, underlying the dynamics in counterfactual V and counterfac-
tual I; it is absent from counterfactual II on skill-bias in medical effectiveness, where the
impact on the longevity gap essentially arises for given spending patterns. At the same
time, the effects through counterfactual III on skill-bias in health insurance are quantita-
tively small. Thus, with two of the three biases unrelated in a quantitatively meaningful
way to changes in spending incentives, this shuts down the channel for complementarities
to take effect across the skill-biases addressed in I-III.
6 Policy Implications and the Role of Medical Progress
Our results suggest that a policy-maker concerned about unequal access to health care
should pay particularly close scrutiny to two features of the access to health care, both of
which are intricately related to medical progress.
First, it may well be more effective to enable disadvantaged groups to access the most
effective forms of health care and use health care effectively than to mitigate a divergent
ability of different social groups to pay for health care. Notably the skill-bias in the effec-
tiveness of health care, as measured byMs (t) /Mu (t)−1 = Ms (t) /Ms (t− 8)−1 = e8gM−1,
increases in the rate of medical progress, gM . Thus, while welcome per se, a higher pace
of medical progress may well exarcerbate the access gap to the disadvantage of the un-
skilled if they are struggling with catching up. Thus, policies based on the provision of
information on the availability and effective use of state-of-the-art diagnosis and treatment
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as well as targeted programmes that facilitate the access to advanced and complex hos-
pital care and/or pharmaceutical therapies are likely to prove more effective than a pure
redistribution of income. Especially, the introduction of appropriate programmes of man-
aging chronic conditions appears to be important here (e.g. Schoen et al. 2008; Ro¨ttger
et al. 2017). Stretching beyond health care policies, our results reinforce earlier findings
that the provision of universal education that helps individuals to manage their health
and overcome access barriers to the health care system (regardless of income) should be
instrumental in lowering the longevity gap.
Second, and now turning to the role of income as a determinant of access, even
if the widening of the income gap can be stopped, this would not stop the widening
of the longevity gap that comes with continued medical progress. Even just to arrest
the divergence in longevity, the policy-maker would effectively have to close the income
gap. Conversely, while being welcome per se, even unbiased medical progress, such that
Ms (t) /Mu (t)−1 = 0, is prone to bring about an increasing gap in life-expectancy at least
within (private) health care systems with substantial co-payments. Intuitively, income
differences do not translate into different demand for health care unless it is sufficiently
effective in lowering mortality. The implication is that with a view to maintaining or
reducing the longevity gap, increasingly rapid medical progress would need to be accom-
panied by policy measures that enhance the purchase of health care especially by lower
income strata or ensure equal consumption by other means, such as the public provision of
health care. In that sense European health care systems with their greater focus on public
provision are likely to be more robust against an unequal distribution of the benefits from
medical progress.
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7 Conclusions
We have studied an overlapping generations model in which representatives of two groups,
the skilled and the unskilled, purchase health care towards extending their longevity. The
unskilled are subject to four disadvantages: they face lower earnings to begin with, they
face lower earnings growth due to skill-biased technological change, they face a lag in access
to the most effective medical technology, and they benefit less from health insurance. Based
on a calibration of the model to reflect the US economy and health care system over the
time span 1960-2015 we study the extent to which these four disadvantages explain the
emerging longevity gap between the recipients of the top 50% (net) income, tantamount
to the skilled in our model, and the recipients of the bottom 50%, tantamount to the
unskilled. We find that while all four channels contribute to the emergence of the longevity
gap, differences in health insurance coverage and differential earnings growth explain the
least of the increase while skill-bias in the access to and use of advanced medical technology
plays a very strong part. Notably, however, even in the presence of symmetric access to
state-of-the art health care, the skilled are prone to benefit more, and increasingly so,
from medical progress than the unskilled. This is owing to the higher propensity of high
income earners to spend on health care into which medical progress is ”embedded”. Due to
the complementarity between income and medical progress, this propensity increases over
time, driving a growing spending wedge between the skilled and the unskilled. We find
that both that the impact of both skill-bias in income and skill-bias in effectiveness tends
to be magnified in the presence of medical progress. The risk of the disadvantaged being
increasingly left behind in environments with rapid medical change calls for accompanying
policies both in regard to incentivising and enabling the disadvantaged to participate in
the benefits from medical progress.
While our model offers a first theory-guided perspective on the channels through which
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socioeconomic inequality drives inequality in longevity, a number of open issues merit
further attention. First, by considering a fixed population that is split into the 50 percent
top earners as opposed to the 50 percent bottom earners our current model abstracts from
the way in which the income distribution relates to the distribution of skills or education
for that matter. We believe this stylisation to be immaterial for our current results as (i)
educational choices are not the focus of this analysis; and (ii) the evolution of wages is
taken from the data and, as such, reflects the dynamics of the underlying education/skill
structure. Our modelling of a population cleanly structured by the 50 % top and bottom
earners then has the merit of allowing a clean characterisation of the representative life-
cycle allocation within each group and a clean comparison of outcomes across the two
groups. It does rule out, however, the study of societal and/or policy changes that lead to
changes in the educational distribution. There is an interest in understanding how these
changes determine the shape of the income distribution in a richer model in which wages
are not just driven by exogenous (biased) productivity growth but also by the size and
labour supply of the different skill groups. From a quantitative angle, there is an interest
in disaggregating the two groups into finer grained social strata in order to identify the
longevity impact of what is likely to be much larger heterogeneity in terms of access barriers
to effective health care at the tails of the distribution. Further scope for research lies in an
analysis of the extent to which the access to health care is shaped by family background.36
Chetty et al. (2014) document rather stable patterns of social mobility for the US over time
but argue that consequences may be harsher with rising inequality. Bo¨hm et al. (2015)
show that the public provision of higher education yields only limited retruns to the low
skilled. Our analysis suggests that similar arguments are likely to apply in respect to the
social gradient in the access to innovative medicine and the resulting health outcomes.
Second, we assume that health only bears on longevity, whereas in reality the feedback
36We are grateful to a reviewer for drawing our attention to this issue.
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channel of health on labour supply and, thus, on income is prone to play a role. This
is particularly true for the unskilled who typically face health-related restrictions in their
labour supply fairly early on in life. Prados (2017) estimates the contribution of health
differences to the emergence of earnings inequality over the life-cycle to be around 9 percent.
While raising policy issues in its own right, we would consider this feedback to be of
comparatively minor importance in respect to the main objective of our paper which was
to assess the contribution of (exogenous yet properly calibrated) earnings inequality as
opposed to other skill/education-related drivers of the longevity gap.
Third, we have cast our study against a US backdrop, which may raise questions about
the extent to which our results extend to European health care systems that typically
feature more extensive health insurance coverage or the straight public provision of health
care. Better access in financial terms would clearly imply a smaller longevity gap and one
that is more prominently driven by direct skill/education-bias in the access to state-of-the
art health care, as documented by Fiva et al. (2014) for Norway, or in the effective use
of health care, as documented by Avitabile et al. (2011) for a set of European countries.
Strikingly, however, Bago d’Uva and Jones (2009) and Vallejo-Torres and Morris (2013)
provide evidence of a positively sloped income gradient in utilisation even in the absence
of substantial out-of-pocket payments. To study this issue, one would require a non-
trivial extension of the model where the demand for health care is governed by a time
cost. A positively rather than negatively sloped income gradient in utilisation would then
seem to imply that the income gradient in the valuation of health/survival more than
overcompensates the gradient in the time cost associated with the consumption of health
care.
Fourth, while our model is relying on market clearance through price adjustments,
which we believe to be a reasonable representation of the US health care system, congestion
within the health care system may pose direct constraints on access. While we need to
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relegate to future research the modelling of congestion as an endogenous gap between the
demand for health care and a constrained capacity, we can speculate on its consequences
within the setting we are considering. In as far as congestion leads to a uniform increase in
the price for health care akin to medical price inflation, this would be detrimental to the
survival of both skill groups but without further consequences for the longevity gradient. In
as far as congestion is associated with a lower effectiveness of care (due to e.g. waiting times
or cuts in the quality of health care) the consequences depend on whether the reduction
in effectiveness is symmetric or whether it is biased against one of the skill groups. In the
former case, congestion would lower the survival prospects for both skill groups but, in
reversal to the impact of medical progress, may effectively reduce the longevity gap. This
effect would be offset to the extent that the unskilled are more exposed to the impact of
congestion.
Fifth, Chetty et al. (2016) find that the longevity gap is considerably smaller in aﬄuent
cities with well-educated populations, such as New York or San Francisco. The authors
suggest that one possible reason for this may lie in the presence of neighbourhood effects
leading to spillovers from well-educated individuals to the less-educated. These may come
in the direct form of informational spillovers through social exchange, but perhaps more
so through the provision of better and/or more extensive health care facilities with public
good features financed through the higher expenditure of the skilled/well-to-do. Similarly,
the higher spending of the skilled/well-to-do may induce R&D into medical innovations
which subsequently benefit the unskilled as well (see Frankovic and Kuhn 2018 for a similar
argument relating to intergenerational spillovers). Tracing out how policy and institutions
are shaping such spillovers constitutes an interesting application of our model.
We relegate extensions along these five lines to future study.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Optimal Solution to the Life-cycle Problem
For notational convenience, we drop the group index i. The individual’s life-cycle problem,
i.e. the maximisation of (5) subject to (6) and (7) can be expressed by the Hamiltonian
H = uS − λSµS + λk (rk + lw − c− φp(h+ e)− τ + pi + s) ,
with λS and λk denoting the co-states on S and k, respectively. We obtain the first-order
conditions37
Hc = ucS − λk = 0, (28)
Hh = −λSηmhS − λkφp = 0, (29)
and the adjoint equations
·
λS = (ρ+ µ)λS − u+ λkφpeS, (30)
·
λk = (ρ− r)λk. (31)
Evaluating (28) at two different ages/years (a, t) and (â, t+ â− a), equating the terms,
and rearranging gives us
uc (c (â, t+ â− a))
uc (c (a, t))
=
λk (â, t+ â− a)
λk (a, t)
S (a, t)
S (â, t+ â− a)
= exp
{∫ â
a
[
ρ+ µ
(̂̂a, t+ ̂̂a− a)− r (t+ ̂̂a− a)] d̂̂a} , (32)
where the second equality follows when integrating the adjoint equation (31) to obtain λk.
Substituting uc (c) = c
−σ, as from (4), and rearranging further, (32) is readily transformed
into the Euler equation (25) given in the main body of the paper.
Inserting (28) into (29) allows to rewrite the first-order condition for health care as
λS
uc
= − φp
ηmh
. (33)
Integrating (30) we obtain
λS (a, t) =
∫ ω
a
[u(c (·))− uc(c (·))φ (·) p (t+ â− a) eS (S(·))S(·)]
× exp
[
−
∫ â
a
(
ρ+ µ
(̂̂a, t+ ̂̂a− a)) d̂̂a] dâ,
37Here, uc, mh and eS refer to the partial derivatives of the respective functions.
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where (·) = (â, t+ â− a). Using this, we can express the value of health/survival as
ψ (a, t) :=
λS (a, t)
uc (a, t)
=
∫ ω
a
uc (c (â, t+ â− a))
uc (c (a, t))
[
u (c (·))
uc (c (·)) − φ (·) p (t+ â− a) eS (S(·))S(·)
]
× exp
[
−
∫ â
a
(
ρ+ µ
(̂̂a, t+ ̂̂a− a)) d̂̂a] dâ.
Inserting from (32); observing from (3) and (4) that eS (S(·)) = ξ2e(S(·))S(·) and u(c(·))uc(c(·)) =
c(·)
1−σ +
c (·)σ b, respectively; substituting and rearranging appropriately gives (26) in the main body
of the paper. Inserting this into (33); observing from (1) and (2) that ηmh =
ηMm
h
= Mµ
h
;
substituting and rearranging then gives (27) in the main body of the paper.
8.2 Characterisation of General Equilibrium
In this Appendix we provide a general characterisation of the general equilibrium, defer-
ring to Appendix 8.3 a more detailed derivation for the case of Cobb-Douglas production
functions. For each period t we have the following unknown variables:
• inputs {KY (t) , KH (t) , LYs (t), LYu (t), LHs (t), LHu (t)} ,
• prices {r (t) , ws (t) , wu (t) , p (t)} ,
• aggregate demand {C (t) , H (t)} ,
• aggregate net saving, equivalent to the change in the capital stock
·
K (t) ,
summing up to 13 variables. These are determined through (we drop the time index
for convenience)
• 6 first-order conditions on factor inputs [see (34)-(36) in Appendix 8.3], which give the
factor demand functions {K̂Y (r, ws, wu) , K̂H (r, ws, wu, p) , L̂Ys (r, ws, wu) , L̂Yu (r, ws, wu) ,
L̂Hs (r, ws, wu, p) , L̂
H
u (r, ws, wu, p)}, depending on the factor prices and, in case of the
health care sector, on the price for health care;
• a set of first-order conditions (25) and (27) for a ∈ [0, ω], which together with
the individual’s life-cycle budget constraint (7) determine the (a, t, i)−specific lev-
els of consumption ci (a, t) and elective health care hi (a, t) . Aggregation according
to (11) and (12) gives the demand for consumption C (r, ws, wu, p) and health care
H (r, ws, wu, p) , depending on the four prices;
38
38Through the life-cycle budget constraint and the individual Euler equation, the demand function C (·)
is also contingent on the expectation about future prices over the remaining life-course. The same applies
to the demand function H (·) for which the future price paths filter in through the value of health/survival.
50
• 5 market clearing conditions
K̂Y (r, ws, wu) + K̂
H (r, ws, wu, p) = K,
L̂Ys (r, ws, wu) + L̂
H
s (r, ws, wu, p) = Ls,
L̂Yu (r, ws, wu) + L̂
H
u (r, ws, wu, p) = Lu
F (AH , K̂H (r, ws, wu, p) , L̂
H
s (r, ws, wu, p) , L̂
H
u (r, ws, wu, p)) = H (r, ws, wu, p) ,
Y (AY , K̂Y (r, ws, wu, p) , L̂
Y
s (r, ws, wu, p) , L̂
Y
u (r, ws, wu, p)) = C (r, ws, wu, p) +
·
K + δK,
which determine the set of equilibrium prices {r∗, w∗s , w∗u, p∗} and aggregate net sav-
ing, as captured by
·
K.
8.3 Equilibrium Relationships with Cobb-Douglas Technologies
For reasons of saving space, we omit time indices throughout. Perfectly competitive firms
in the production sector choose capital KY and labour
{
LYs , L
Y
u
}
so as to maximise period
profit (14) subject to the production technology in (13). Likewise, providers of health care
choose capital KH and labour
{
LHs , L
H
u
}
so as to maximise period profit (16) subject to
(15). From the first-order conditions
r + δ =
αKY
KY
=
pβKF
KH
, (34)
ws =
αsY
LYs
=
pβsF
LHs
, (35)
wu =
αuY
LYu
=
pβuF
LHu
, (36)
we obtain factor demand as
KY =
αKY
r + δ
, LYs =
αsY
ws
, LYu =
αuY
wu
,
and
KH =
βKpF
r + δ
, LHs =
βspF
ws
, LHu =
βupF
wu
, (37)
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respectively. From this we can calculate the factor intensities
kY : =
KY
LYu
=
αK
αu
wu
r + δ
, (38)
`Y : =
LYs
LYu
=
αs
αu
wu
ws
, (39)
kH : =
KH
LHu
=
βK
βu
wu
r + δ
, (40)
`H : =
LHs
LHu
=
βs
βs
wu
ws
, (41)
respectively. Now write
wu =
αuY
LYu
= αuA
Y
(
kY
)αK (`Y )αs = αuAY (αK
αu
wu
r + δ
)αK (
`Y
)αs
and solve for
wu = ŵu
(
r, `Y
)
= αu
[
AY
(
αK
r + δ
)αK (
`Y
)αs] 11−αK
. (42)
We then obtain from (39)
ws = ŵs
(
r, `Y
)
=
αs
αu
ŵu
(
r, `Y
)
`Y
= αs
[
AY
(
αK
r + δ
)αK (
`Y
)−αu] 11−αK
. (43)
Inserting from (37) into (15) and solving for p we obtain
p = p̂
(
r, `Y
)
=
1
AH
(
r + δ
βK
)βK (ŵs (r, `Y )
βs
)βs (
ŵu
(
r, `Y
)
βu
)βu
(44)
with ŵu
(
r, `Y
)
and ŵs
(
r, `Y
)
as given by (42) and (43), respectively. This fixes the wage
rates and the price for health care as functions of the interest rate and the ”skill-intensity”
in final goods production, `Y . Using Ls and Lu to denote the supply of skilled and unskilled
labour, respectively, we can write
`Y =
LYs
LYu
=
Ls − LHs
Lu − LHu
=
Ls − `HLHu
Lu − LHu
=
Ls −
(
βs
βu
αu
αs
)
`YLHu
Lu − LHu
. (45)
where we have employed `H =
(
βs
βu
αu
αs
)
`Y as from (39) and (41). The outer equation in
(45) solves to
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`Y = ̂`Y (LHu ) = Ls
Lu −
(
1− βs
βu
αu
αs
)
LHu
, (46)
which fixes the skill-intensity as a function of unskilled labour demand in the health care
sector (as well as the exogenous levels of skilled and unskilled labour supply).
Using the market clearing condition in the health care sector and inserting from (40)
and (41), we obtain
H = AHLHu
βK
βu
ŵu
(
r, ̂`Y (LHu ))
r + δ
βK βs
βu
ŵu
(
r, ̂`Y (LHu ))
ŵs
(
r, ̂`Y (LHu ))
βs
= AHLHu
βK
βu
ŵu
(
r, ̂`Y (LHu ))
r + δ
βK (βs
βu
αu
αs
̂`Y (LHu ))βs ,
with ŵu
(
r, ̂`Y (LHu )) and ̂`Y (LHu ) as defined in (42) and (46), respectively. The equality
can be solved to obtain the demand for unskilled labour as a function of the interest rate
[and the equilibrium demand for health careH = Ĥ
(
p̂
(
r, ̂`Y (LHu )))] such that ultimately,
LHu = L̂
H
u (r). This also fixes the skill-intensity
̂`Y (L̂Hu (r)) and, in turn, all prices as a
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function of the interest rate. The remaining factor demand functions then follow as
L̂Yu (r) = Lu − L̂Hu (r)
L̂SH (r) =
(
βs
βu
αu
αs
) ̂`Y (L̂Hu (r)) L̂Hu (r) =
(
βs
βu
αu
αs
)
LsL̂
H
u (r)
Lu −
(
1− βs
βu
αu
αs
)
L̂Hu (r)
L̂SY (r) = Ls − L̂SH (r) =
Ls
[
Lu − L̂Hu (r)
]
Lu −
(
1− βs
βu
αu
αs
)
L̂Hu (r)
K̂H (r) =
βK
βu
ŵu
(
r, ̂`Y (L̂Hu (r)))
r + δ
L̂Hu (r)
=
βK
βu
αu
[
AY
(
αK
r+δ
)αK ( Ls
Lu−(1− βsβu
αu
αs
)L̂Hu (r)
)αs] 11−αK
r + δ
L̂Hu (r)
K̂Y (r) =
αK
αu
ŵu
(
r, ̂`Y (L̂Hu (r)))
r + δ
L̂Yu (r)
=
αK
αu
αu
[
AY
(
αK
r+δ
)αK ( Ls
Lu−(1− βsβu
αu
αs
)L̂Hu (r)
)αs] 11−αK
r + δ
[
Lu − L̂Hu (r)
]
.
Thus, in order to ensure non-negative factor inputs, we need to make but a single assump-
tion, namely that Lu ≥ L̂Hu (r) .
This leaves r and
.
K to be determined. The former follows from the capital market
equilibrium
K̂Y (r) + K̂H (r) = K (r) ,
the latter follows from the goods market equilibrium
AY
(
K̂Y (r)
)αK (
L̂Ys (r)
)αs (
L̂Yu (r)
)αu
= C + δ
[
K̂Y (r) + K̂H (r)
]
+
.
K.
8.4 Solving the Numerical Problem
We pursue the following steps towards tracing out the numerical solution, sketched here
for the benchmark scenario:
1. We derive from the first-order condition for consumption (25) the relationship
ci (a, t0 + a)
−σ = ci (0, t0)
−σ exp
{∫ a
0
[ρ− r(t0 + aˆ) + µi(aˆ, t0 + aˆ)] daˆ
}
. (47)
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for i = s, u.
2. We derive the life-cycle budget constraint
∫ ω
0
 wi (t0 + a) l (a)− ci (a, t0 + a) + pii(a, t)−φi(a, t)p (t0 + a) (hi (a, t0 + a) + e (Si (a, t0 + a)))
−τi(a, t) + s(t0 + a)
R (a, 0) da = 0,
with R (a, 0) as given by
R (â, a) := exp
[
−
∫ â
a
r
(
t+ ̂̂a− a) d̂̂a] . (48)
We then insert (47) and obtain the consumption level
ci (0, t0) =
∫ ω
0
[
wi (t0 + a) l (a) + pii(a, t)− τi(a, t) + s(t0 + a)
−φi(a, t)p (t0 + a) (hi (a, t0 + a) + e (Si (a, t0 + a)))
]
R (a, 0) da∫ ω
0
exp
{∫ a
0
[
1−σ
σ
r(t0 + aˆ)− ρ+µi(aˆ,t0+aˆ)σ
]
daˆ
}
da
(49)
for an individual born at t0, contingent on the stream of health care, hi (a, t0 + a) ,
and the set of prices {wi (t0 + a) , r(t0 + a), p (t0 + a)} over the interval [t0, t0 + ω] .
Finally, we need to keep track of the constraint on minimum consumption at the
level of social security benefits. As is readily checked from the numerical analysis,
this constraint is binding only at the highest ages.
3. We derive from the first-order condition for health care (27) a vector of age-specific
demand levels
hi(a, t0 + a) =
(
ψi(a, t0 + a)ηi(a, t0 + a)Mi(t0 + a)
φi(a, t0 + a)p(t0 + a)
) 1
1+Mi(t0+a)
(50)
for all a ∈ [0, ω] .
4. We show in section 8.3 that the set of prices {wi (t0 + a) , p (t0 + a)} as well as all
input and output quantities can be expressed in terms of the interest rate r(t0 + a)
alone.
5. Using (49) together with (50) we can calculate the life-cycle allocation for consump-
tion, ci (a, t0 + a), depending on the allocation for health expenditures, hi(a, t0 + a),
∀a ∈ [0, ω] and on the set of prices {wi (t0 + a) , r(t0 + a), p (t0 + a)} over the interval
[t0, t0 + ω]. Vice versa, the allocation of health expenditures can be calculated from
the allocation of consumption and the macroeconomic prices.
6. We apply these calculations iteratively on initial guesses of c and h. We then use the
results as an initial input to the age-structured optimal control algorithm, as pre-
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sented in Veliov (2003). This yields an optimal allocation of individual consumption
and health expenditures contingent on an initially assumed r(t0 + a).
7. Drawing on this, we apply the following recursive approximation algorithm: (i) Guess
an initial interest rate r(t0 + a) and derive the optimal life-cycle allocation. (ii)
Based on this, calculate the market interest rate r∗(t0 + a) from the capital market
equilibrium K̂Y (r(t0 + a)) + K̂
H (r(t0 + a)) = K (r(t0 + a)) . (iii) Adjust the initial
interest rate, so that it approaches r∗(t0 + a), e.g. by setting r1(t0 + a) := r0(t0 +
a) + (r∗(t0 + a) − r0(t0 + a)),  ∈ (0, 1]. The process converges to an interest
rate for which households optimise and capital demand equals capital supply. The
output market clearing condition, Y (t0 + a) = C(t0 + a) + K˙(t0 + a) + δK(t0 + a)
then determines the dynamics of the capital stock to the next period. (iv) This
process is reiterated in a recursive way, employing a solution algorithm based on
Newton’s method. Equations (49)-(50) allow us to verify ex-post an optimum life-
cycle allocation for the focal cohort born at t0. While the numerical algorithm cannot
determine in a precise way the optimal allocation for other cohorts, it nevertheless
structures the allocation in a way that approximates the optimum for all cohorts.
We solve the model over a period of 300 periods, covering the years 1850-2150. The
number of periods is chosen to be this large in order for the initial and final conditions of the
model simulation not to matter for the period of interest (1960-2015). The periods 1850 to
1950 are characterised by a steady state where all exogenous variables generating the model
dynamics (i.e. AY , AH , Ms etc.) over the period of interest are held constant. Beginning
in 1950, we impose growth trends on the exogenous variables so as to generate the baseline
model dynamics described in the main text. To generate the counterfactual experiments,
we switch off the growth in the corresponding exogenous variables. The periods after 2015
describe a slow reduction in the growth rate of these exogenous variables over a period
of 50 years and a steady-state over the remaining periods up to 2150. The simulation of
the periods before and after the time frame of interest has no economic interpretation and
only serves the purpose of providing a stable steady-state between the calibrated dynamic
transition process.
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